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A SQUARE PEG TRYING TO FIT INTO A ROUND HOLE: THE FEDERAL 
COMMUNICATION COMMISSION’S EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 





In Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. Federal Communication Commission,1 the 
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Federal Communications 
Commission’s2 equal employment regulations (EEO)3 were unconstitutional.4  The 
                                                 
1 141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998), reh’g denied, 154 F.3d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1998), suggestions on 
reh’g en banc denied, 154 F.3d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
2 Federal regulation of the radio and airwaves originated with the Wireless and Ship Act 
ch. 379, 36 Stat. 629 (1910).  In 1912 the government banned the use of radio frequencies 
without a government issued license from the Secretary of Commerce and Labor. ch. 287, 37 
Stat. 302 (1912).  The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), was created by the 1934 
Communications Act.  See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934).  
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in 
communications by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all 
the people of the United States, without discrimination on the basis of race, color, 
religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire 
and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for 
the purpose of the national defense, for the purpose of promoting safety of life and 
property through the use of wire and radio communication, and for the purpose of 
securing a more effective execution of this policy by centralizing authority 
heretofore granted by law to several agencies and by granting additional authority 
with respect to interstate and foreign commerce in wire and radio communication,  
there is created a commission to be known as the “Federal Communications 
Commission,” which shall be constituted as hereinafter provided, and which shall 
execute and enforce the provisions of this chapter.  
Id.  
3 The equal employment opportunity program.  47 C.F.R §73.2080 (1997). 
4 Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 354-55.  The court held the EEO regulations influenced 
hiring, obliging the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod (Church) to grant preference to 
minorities and women. The FCC’s interest in diversity in programming did not rise to the level 
of a compelling governmental interest as required under the strict scrutiny standard as 
described in Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (invalidating a racial 
preference for construction contracts).  Id. at 354.  
1
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Church challenged the application of the FCC’s religious preference exemption policy5 
and the future effect of the EEO regulations.6  
 
The purpose of this Note is to examine the judicial review of the FCC’s quasi-judicial 
powers.  Part II explores the FCC’s EEO regulations and the appropriate standard of 
review for racial classifications.7  Part III reviews the particular facts of this case and 
the holding of the court.8  Finally, Part IV analyzes the court’s decision as a protection 




A. Development of FCC’s Current EEO Regulations  
 
In 1969, the FCC furthered an emerging national policy against discrimination in 
employment by incorporating an EEO policy into FCC regulations.10  The FCC 
currently evaluates a broadcast station’s compliance with the EEO regulations11 during 
                                                 
5 In King’s Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 61 (1974), the court held the FCC’s “anti-bias 
rules will not compromise the licensee’s freedom of religious expression.”  The FCC applied a 
nexus test to determine exemptions.  Id.   A position that was not substantially connected to 
the program content or a position that was connected to only non-religious programming was 
not exempt.  Id. 
6 Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 154 F.3d 487, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  The panel 
stated  “whenever a party challenges the regulatory basis for a sanction it necessarily 
challenged the future effect of the regulation.”  Id.   
7 See infra  Part II.A-B.  
8 See infra  Part III.A-D. 
9 See infra  Part IV.A-D. 
10  Nondiscrimination in Employment Practices 18 F.C.C.2d 240, ¶¶ 4-8, (1969) (Report and 
Order).  In 1968, the FCC determined that a station was not serving the entire audience if a 
licensee practiced discrimination in employment.  Nondiscrimination Employment Practices, 13 
F.C.C.2d 766, ¶¶ 9, 10 (1968) (Mem. Op. and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).  The 
FCC initially regulated compliance in response to employee complaints.  Id. at  ¶ 15.  
Recognizing an independent responsibility to ensure the national policy of anti-discrimination 
in employment, the FCC adopted rules similar to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission to determine non-compliance and other regulations to identify the minority 
groups in the greatest need of assistance.  In Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 379 (1969), the 
Supreme Court held that licensed stations were public trustees, obliging stations to present a 
variety of viewpoints.   
11  The EEO regulations require the licensee to exercise non-discriminatory employment 
practices and to establish an EEO program: 
 (a)  General EEO policy.  Equal opportunity in employment shall be afforded by all 
licensees or permittees of commercially or noncommercially operated AM, FM, 
TV, or international broadcast stations (as defined in this part) to all qualified 
persons, and no person shall be discriminated against in employment by such 
2
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the license renewal process.12  In 1980, the FCC enacted procedural guidelines13 to 
screen for license renewal applications with the least successful EEO performance 
records.14  A station failing to meet the processing guidelines that had skill specific 
                                                                                                                         
stations because of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. 
 (2)  EEO program.  Each broadcast station shall establish, maintain, and 
carry out a positive continuing program of specific 
practices designed to ensure equal opportunity in every 
aspect of station employment policy and practice. . . .  
. . . .  
(c)  EEO program requirements.  A broadcast station's equal employment 
opportunity program should reasonably address itself to the[se] specific areas:  
(1)  Disseminate its equal opportunity program to job applicants . . . . 
(2)  Use minority organizations, organizations for women, media, educational 
institutions, and other potential sources of minority and female applicants, to 
supply referrals whenever job vacancies are available in its operation. . . . 
. . . . 
(3) Evaluate its employment profile and job turnover against the availability 
of minorities and women in its recruitment area. 
. . . . 
(4) Undertake to offer promotions of qualified minorities and women in a 
nondiscriminatory fashion to positions of greater responsibility. . . . 
. . . . 
(5)  Analyze its efforts to recruit, hire, and promote minorities and women 
and address any difficulties encountered in implementing its equal 
employment opportunity program. . . . 
. . . . 
47 C.F.R. § 73.2080 (1997). 
12 47 U.S.C.A. § 308 (1998). 
13 The proposed guidelines were strongly opposed by the National Association of 
Broadcasters.  EEO Guideline Modification 79 F.C.C.2d  922, ¶¶ 2-4 (1980) (Mem. Op. And 
Order).  The National Association of Broadcasters raised three objections to the proposed 
guidelines.  First, the Association argued that according to the Administrative Procedure Act, 
5 U.S.C. §  553 (1980), the FCC was required to provide note and comment because the 
guidelines were substantive rather than procedural.  Id.  Second, the FCC failed to take into 
consideration the available workforce in the top four job categories making its determination 
of what constitutes discrimination unfair and unrealistic.  Id.  Finally, the new guidelines 
ignored the good faith efforts of the broadcasters to practice non-discriminatory employment. 
 Id. 
14 The new FCC procedural guidelines created categories based on the size of the station 
and then determined the target percentage of that work force which minorities and women 
should represent: 1) 5 – 10 employees: 25% in the top four positions and 50% in overall work 
3
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positions could supplement its application with census information or other data to 
demonstrate a lack of available minorities and women with the requisite skills.15 
 
In 1987, the FCC shifted the focus of its EEO regulations from a results-based 
approach to an efforts-based approach.16  In effect, the shift was nothing more than 
illusory.  While the new regulations required a station to describe in detail its plan to 
accomplish the hiring goals;17 the regulations still required a broadcast station to meet 
the results-based numerical goals of minority representation in its workforce.18  The 
FCC contends its current EEO regulations are efforts-based and are designed to deter 
discrimination and promote programming that reflects the viewpoints of minorities and 
women.19 
 
B. The Standard of Review for FCC’s EEO Regulations  
 
The United States Supreme Court has struggled with the appropriate standard of 
review for cases regarding race classifications.20  In Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC,21 
                                                                                                                         
force; 2) 11 – 49 employees: 50% in the top four positions and the overall work force; 3) Over 
50 employees automatically receive and in depth review; 4) Less than 5 employees are exempt 
from filing.  EEO Guideline Modifications, 79 F.C.C.2d 922, ¶¶ 5-6 (1980). 
A failure to achieve the listed percentages alerted the FCC to stations needing further 
review, although it did not automatically indicate the presence of discrimination.  Id. at ¶¶ 7, 8. 
 The FCC conducted an in depth review after examining the numerical data and other factors.  
Id. 
A station meeting the processing guidelines established a prima facie showing of non-
discrimination in employment also referred to as the “zone of reasonableness.”  Bilingual 
Bicultural Coalition on Mass Media Inc. v. FCC, 595 F.2d 621, 627, n.15 (1978).  
15 EEO Guideline Modifications, 79 F.C.C.2d 922,¶ 29 (1980). 
16 The FCC adopted a two step approach to evaluate a station’s compliance with the EEO 
regulations.  EEO Rules, 2 F.C.C.R. 3967, ¶ 48 (1987) (Report and Order).  The initial evaluation 
focuses on the station’s renewal application, complaints filed against the station and any 
other information pertaining to the station’s EEO program and policies.  Id.  A station would 
be required to submit additional information regarding specific areas of its EEO program that 
an initial evaluation found unsatisfactory.  Id. 
17 A station can have a proper EEO plan in place and still be in violation of the EEO 
regulations for failure to meet the numerical goals.  Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. 
F.C.C., 141 F.3d 344, 351-54 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  The FCC’s EEO regulation is still a results-based 
approach with an additional reporting requirement of what plans the station has in place to 
accomplish the required results.  Id.  
18 EEO Rules, 2 F.C.C.R. 3967, ¶ 48 (1987) (Report and Order). 
19 EEO Forfeiture Guidelines, 11 F.C.C.R. 5154, ¶¶ 7-12 (1996) (Order and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking);  see also  EEO Rule and Policies, 13 F.C.C.2d 6322, ¶ 9 (1998) (Order and 
Policy Statement). 
20 The Court has applied both a strict scrutiny and an intermediate standard for review of 
governmental race classifications.  Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 
4
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the Court upheld congressional power to adopt an affirmative action plan which did not 
remedy past discrimination.22  Applying an intermediate standard of review,23 the Court 
characterized the FCC minority program as benign24 and recognized a link between 
minority ownership and programming diversity.25 
                                                                                                                         
(1995).  A strict scrutiny standard is met if there is a compelling governmental interest and a 
narrowly tailored means to achieve the government’s objectives.  Id.  An intermediate 
standard is met when an important government interest within Congress’ power is 
substantially related to the achievement of the government’s objectives.  Metro Broadcasting 
Inc., v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990), overruled by Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
Until 1990, the Supreme Court decisions regarding race classifications “taken together . . . 
[led] to the conclusion that any person, of whatever race, ha[d] the right to demand that any 
governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that 
person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.” Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224; 
see also  Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion 
invalidating a state medical school admission policy which reserved places for minority 
students); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion invalidating a 
school’s race-based determinations of priorities for a lay-off of teachers); and City of 
Richmond v. Cronson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (invalidating a state apportionment to minority 
construction businesses); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (validating the minority 
business enterprise provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977).  
21 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).  
22 The Court reviewed two minority preference policies: 1) an enhancement award for 
minority applicants in competitive proceedings for new licenses; and 2) minority distress 
sales which permitted a limited number of current broadcast stations to sell their license 
before they were denied renewal.  Id. at 547-48.  For an indepth discussion of Metro , see 
Kathleen Ann Kirby, Shouldn’t the Constitution Be Color Blind? Metro Broadcasting, Inc. 
v. FCC Transmits A Surprising Message on Racial Preferences, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 403, 406 
(1991) (“The Court, for the first time, upheld Congress’ power to adopt affirmative action 
plans to promote racial and ethnic diversity rather than simply to remedy past 
discrimination.”). 
23 The Court held:  
. . . that benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress- even if the 
measures are not remedial in the sense of being designed to comp ensate victims of 
past government or societal discriminations- are constitutionally permissible to the 
extent they serve important government objectives within the power of Congress 
and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives. 
Metro , 497 U.S. at 564-65 (emphasis added); cf. Mary Tabor, Encouraging “Those Who 
Would Speak Out With Fresh Voice” Through The Federal Communications Commission’s 
Minority Ownership Policies, 76 IOWA L. REV. 609, 639 (1991) (claiming the intermediate level 
standard adopted by the Court in Metro  did not go far enough because the Court left 
unanswered the constitutionality of affirmative action programs with less congressional 
support). 
24 Metro , 497 U.S. at 564-65.  The Court labeled the FCC policies as benign “confident that 
an examination of the legislative scheme and its history . . . will separate benign measures 
from other types of racial classification.”  Id. at 565, n.12 (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 
5
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Justice O’Connor’s dissent26 argued that the majority opinion strayed from the 
traditional approach27 of reviewing racial classifications as permissible only if they are 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest,28 and that only a 
                                                                                                                         
420 U.S. 636, 648, n.16) (1975)).  The Court justified its classification by stating “the concept 
of benign race-conscious measures –even those with at least some nonremedial purposes—is 
as old as the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 656, n.12; see also  Ken Feagins, Wanted—
Diversity: White Heterosexual Males Need Not Apply, 4 WIDENER  J. PUB. L. 1, 4 (1994) 
(describing the difference between a benign act and discriminatory act.).  A benign act 
provides an individual access to a benefit without depriving another.  Id.  A discriminatory 
act is distinguished as denying an opportunity to an individual in order to grant it to another. 
 Id.  But see Metro , 497 U.S. at 609 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that “[b]enign racial 
classification is a contradiction in terms.”).  Justice Kennedy also dissented stating 
“[a]lthough the majority is ‘confident’ that it can determine when racial discrimination is 
benign . . . it offers no explanation as to how it will do so.”  Id. at 635 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting).  According to Justice Kennedy’s dissent, “[p]olicies of racial separation and 
preference are almost always justified as benign, even when it is clear to any sensible 
observer that they are not.”  Id. 
25 A “broadcasting industry with representative minority participation will produce more 
variation and diversity than one whose ownership is drawn from a single racially or ethnically 
homogenous group.”  Metro , 497 U.S. at 579.  The nexus between minority ownership and 
diversity in programming is based on the premise that “a race-neutral means could not 
produce adequate broadcasting diversity.”  Id. at 589.  A determination that this nexus does 
exist is “revealed by the historical evolution of current federal policy, both Congress and the 
Commission have concluded that the minority ownership programs are critical means of 
promoting broadcast diversity . . . [the Court] give[s] great weight to their joint 
determination.”  Id. at  579.   The existence of a nexus is a predictive judgment because “there 
is no ironclad guarantee that each minority owner will contribute to diversity.”  Id.  In Justice 
O’Connor’s dissent, she describes the nexus between minority ownership and program 
diversity as valid only to the degree that minority owned stations provide the viewpoint the 
FCC determines is lacking.  Id. at 618-19 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
26 Id. at 611-12 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing the majority opinion is without support 
from precedent and the current FCC minority preference policies fail under a strict scrutiny 
and intermediate standard of review). 
27 The Court stated: 
‘Any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most 
searching examination to make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional 
guarantees.’  There are two prongs to this examination.  First, any racial 
classification ‘must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.’  Second, the 
means chosen by the State to effectuate its purpose must be ‘narrowly tailored to 
the achievement of that goal.’ 
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986) (citations omitted). 
28 Metro , 497 U.S. at 612 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Modern equal protection doctrine 
has recognized only one such [compelling] interest: remedying the effects of racial 
discrimination.”). 
6
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remedial race classification would require the more demanding strict scrutiny 
standard.29  Justice O’Connor concluded that the majority opinion upholding the FCC 
minority preference policies lacked precedential support.30   
 
Five years later, in Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena,31 the Court overruled 
Metro32 and required that race classifications be reviewed under a strict scrutiny 
standard.33  The majority explored the development of the strict scrutiny and 
intermediate standard of review for state and federal governmental race 
classifications.34  The decision in Adarand renders the FCC’s EEO regulations 
unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny standard of review.  Metro’s intermediate 
standard of review was no longer appropriate.35   
 
                                                 
29 Id. at 607 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Contra , Akosua Barthwell Evans, Are Minority 
Preferences Necessary? Another Look at the Radio Broadcast Industry, 8 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 380, 411 (1990) (“Minority preference policies are necessary to address past 
discrimination and ensure that minority viewpoints are represented on the public airwaves.”); 
 see Theresa Brunson, The Federal Communication Commission’s Commitment to 
Regulating Equal Employment Opportunity in the Broadcast Industry, 1 HOW. SCROLL 100 
(1993) (finding that FCC failure to enforce EEO regulations resulted in a history of sanctioned 
discrimination for minorities in the broadcast industry). 
30 In City of Richmond v. Cronson, the Court held that a remedy for societal discrimination 
does not meet compelling interest of strict scrutiny.  488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989) (invalidating a 
state apportionment to minority construction businesses). 
31 515 U.S. 200 (1995).  In Adarand, the lowest bidding sub-contractor was passed over for 
a minority sub-contractor.  Id. at 200.  The Court held that racial classifications of this type 
must be reviewed under a strict scrutiny standard.  Id. at 226. 
32 497 U.S. 547 (1990).  
33 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.  “[A]ll racial classification, imposed by whatever Federal . . . 
actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. . . .  [S]uch classifications 
are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling 
government interests.  To the extent [Metro] is inconsistent with that holding, it is overruled.” 
 Id. 
34  The majority in Adarand focused on the propositions of skepticism, consistency and 
congruence from past cases to hold the decision in Metro  represented “a significant 
departure from what came before it.”  Id at 225-27.  The Court’s skepticism of racial 
classifications, need for consistency in application of equal protection and congruency 
between the State and Federal protection led to the conclusion that a justification for 
subjecting any person to unequal treatment under racial classifications must be “under the 
strictest judicial scrutiny.”  Id. at 223-24.  However, according to Justice Stevens’ dissenting 
opinion, “[i]nstead of deciding this case in accordance with controlling precedent, the Court 
today delivers a disconcerting lecture about the evils of governmental racial classifications.”  
Id. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
35 See id. at 225-29.  
7
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After Adarand, the Department of Justice (D.O.J.) issued a memorandum to provide 
guidance to Federal agencies.36  The D.O.J. Memorandum justified the use of race as 
operational and consistent with the compelling governmental interest required in 
Adarand.37  The FCC reexamined its EEO regulations and concluded its efforts-based 
approach did not trigger an Adarand strict scrutiny review.38 
 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
A. Facts  
 
On September 29, 1989, the Lutheran Church Missouri-Synod filed an application 
with the FCC for renewal of its license.39  The FCC ruled that the application was 
deficient,40 and requested supplemental information regarding the recruitment of 
minorities and women.41  The NAACP petitioned to deny renewal42 alleging that the 
                                                 
36 Associate Attorney General John R. Schmidt, Post-Adarand Guidance on Affirmative 
Action in Federal Employment  (Feb. 29, 1996), reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 43, at 
D-31 (Mar. 5, 1996)  [hereinafter D.O.J. Memorandum].  
37 D.O.J. Memorandum, supra  note 36, at § 2, ¶ 5.  A compelling interest that may be 
justified as operational providing that “decisionmakers will be exposed to the greatest 
possible diversity of perspectives.”  Id.  But see Kingsley R. Browne, Non-remedial 
Justifications for Affirmative Action In Employment; A Critique of the Justice Department 
Position, 12 LAB. LAW. 451 (1997).  Neither the Congress nor Supreme Court justifies racial 
classification with efficiency concerns.   Id. at 473.  “Contrary to the Justice Department, 
employers may not circumvent this regime by the simple artifice of labeling classifications 
based on operational justifications ‘affirmative action.’ ”  Id. 
38 EEO Forfeiture Guidelines, 11 F.C.C.R. 5154, ¶¶ 13-15 (1996) (Order and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking).  The FCC decided that an Adarand review is inapplicable if the use of 
race is limited to expanding an existing job pool.  Id.  EEO regulations are limited to outreach 
and recruitment not requiring a certain number of minority employees.  Id.; see Federal Power 
Comm’n v. NAACP, 425 U.S. 662 (1976).   
The [FCC] has adopted regulations dealing with the employment practices of its 
regulatees . . . . These regulations can be justified as necessary to enable the FCC to 
satisfy its obligation under the Communications Act of 1934 . . . to ensure its 
licensee’s programming fairly reflects the tastes and viewpoints of minority groups. 
Id. at 670, n.7.  
39 The application was submitted per 47 U.S.C. § 308 (1998).  The license period was 
February 1, 1983 to February 1, 1990.  Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 10 F.C.C.R. 9880, ¶ 
73, (1995) (Initial Decision)  [hereinafter Initial Decision].     
40  The Church’s original application indicated only six hires, two white males and four 
white females during the renewal year.  Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 9 F.C.C.R. 914, ¶ 7, 
(1994) (Hr’g Designation and Order) [hereinafter HDO].  The Church, citing human error, 
corrected the hiring information for the license period.  Id. at ¶ 12.  The Church actually hired 
ten full-time and four part-time positions.  Id. 
41 Although the Church apparently sent referral letters to employment agencies that 
8
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Church EEO program failed to indicate contact with minority organizations,43 failed to 
hire or recruit a minority employee during the previous license period,44 and employed 
only one full-time minority.45  The Church responded with a defense of their EEO 
program and a policy of non-discrimination.46 
 
B. Procedural History  
 
The FCC renewed the Church license47 with reporting sanctions48 but fined the 
Church $25,000.00 for its lack of candor.49  On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit 
                                                                                                                         
handled referrals of minorities and women, the Church did not receive any referrals from these 
organizations.  Id. at ¶ 8. 
42 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ( NAACP), petitioned to 
deny renewal per 47 U.S.C. § 208 (1990).  See Astroline Communications Co. v. FCC, 857 F.2d 
1556 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  The NAACP met the requirements of the two-part test in 47 U.S.C. § 
309(d)(1),(2) (1990), to determine if an intervening party has standing.  Id. at 1561.  First, the 
party submits affidavits to show that it is in the public’s interest to deny the station’s 
application for renewal.  Id.  The FCC determines if a prima facie case to deny the application 
exists.  Second, the FCC decides if there is a substantial issue of fact to support a hearing.  Id. 
  
     The NAACP made specific allegations of fact and stated that Rev. James F DeClure was a 
minority listener who would be seriously aggrieved if the NAACP petition was not granted.  
HDO, 9 F.C.C.R. 914 at ¶¶ 2, 3.   The NAACP was accepted as an interested party.  Id.   
43 47 C.F.R. §73.2080(b)(3) (1997) (requiring a broadcast station to communicate its EEO 
policy to sources of qualified applicants and to maintain continual recruiting assistance with 
these sources). A subsequent section suggests enlisting the aid of minority organizations for 
referrals.  §73.2080(c)(2).  
44 HDO, 9 F.C.C.R. 914 at ¶ 7. 
45 NAACP argues the Church should not get minority credit for the Hispanic employee.  
The FCC defines minority as “Blacks not of Hispanic origin, Asians or Pacific Islanders, 
American Indians or Alaskan Natives and Hispanics”  EEO Rules and Policies, 2 F.C.C.R. 3967 
at App. C, ¶ 1. 
46 HDO, 9 F.C.C.R. 914 at ¶¶ 10, 11.  The Church stated three mitigating circumstances to 
defend their EEO program: 1) large receipt of write in applications; 2) a reciprocal arrangement 
with Concordia Seminary that in exchange for rent free accommodations the Church extends 
positions to seminary students; and 3) management turnover.  Id.  Church supplied statistical 
information per processing guidelines.  Data showed 5% of the Lutherans in Missouri are 
minorities, a listeners poll indicated that 3.7% are black and the Church reasoned .01% of the 
listening area are minorities with classical music training.  Id. at ¶ 11.  
47 Id. at ¶ 38.  The FCC designated the Church’s application for a full hearing.  Id. at ¶ 32; 
see also Initial Decision, 10 F.C.C.R. 9880 at ¶¶ 252-61.  The ALJ determined that during the 
period between Feb. 1, 1983 and Aug. 3, 1987, the Church had flawed but acceptable 
affirmative action efforts.  Id. at ¶ 254.  Between August 3, 1987 and Jan. 2, 1990, the Church 
was not in compliance with 47 C.F.R. 73.2080 (1987).  Id.  However, there was not “one 
scintilla” of evidence that the Church had in fact discriminated against minorities and the ALJ 
determined a denial of the license was not warranted and recommended a forfeiture of fifty 
9
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Court of Appeals held the FCC regulations unconstitutional50  and remanded the case to 
the FCC for a determination on whether the Commission “ha[d] authority to promulgate 
an employment non-discrimination rule.”51   
 
C.  District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals Decision  
 
The issue before the court was the constitutionality of the EEO regulations 
as applied to the Church’s renewal application.52 The court held that the FCC’s 
“diversity in programming”53 interest failed the Adarand strict scrutiny test54 that is 
required for all government racial classifications.55  The court held that the EEO 
                                                                                                                         
thousand dollars and reporting sanctions.  Id.  The FCC issued a reporting sanction and 
reduced the fine to twenty-five thousand dollars.  Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 12 
F.C.C.R. 2152 (1997) (Mem. Op. and Order) [hereinafter MO&O].  
48 The Church sanction was to submit reports annually over the next 3 years containing: 1) 
a list of all job applicants and hires, indicating their referral or recruitment source, job title, 
part-time or full-time status, date of hire, sex, and race or national origin; 2) a list of all 
employees, indicating job title, sex, and race; and 3) a narrative statement detailing the 
station’s efforts to recruit minorities.  MO&O, 12 F.C.C.R. 2152  at ¶¶ 23-24. 
49 Id.  The Church displayed a lack of candor regarding a classical music requirement for 
applicants and the description of its renewal program.  Id. at ¶ 25.  
50 See infra  Part III.C. 
51 Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  The FCC’s 
petition to the court for a rehearing was denied.  154 F.3d 487 (D.C.Cir. 1998), suggestions on 
reh’g en banc denied, 154 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  A petition for a rehearing en banc must 
be filed fourteen days after the decision.  See Michael Botein, Comment, Judicial Review of 
FCC Action, 13 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT. L.J. 317, 340-41 (1995).  Such a hearing is disfavored 
by the court and “is an extremely rare form of relief to secure.”  Id. 
52 Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d. at 356.  The Court only decided whether the affirmative 
action portion of the EEO regulations violated the Fifth Amendment.  Id.  The Church raised 
issues of interference with their religious freedom under the Religious Freedom Act and the 
Free Exercise Clause, which the court did not think prudent to address.  Id.  The Church’s 
arguments that: 1) the FCC decision violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment; 
and 2) the FCC’s failure to reexamine the King’s Garden religious exemption policy were not 
properly before the court.  Id. at 349 n.6.  
53 See id. at 354-55.  The FCC relied on the intermediate standard used in Metro , arguing 
that diversity in programming was an important interest and therefore, constitutional.  Id.  For 
a discussion of the standard used in Metro , see supra  notes 21-23 and accompanying text. 
54 Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995).  The Court established a 
two prong test for strict scrutiny review of racial classifications.  First, the basis for the racial 
classification must be a compelling government interest.  Id.  Second, the interest must be 
narrowly tailored to serve the interest.  Id.  
55 Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d. at 356.  (“The regulations could not pass the substantial 
relation of intermediate scrutiny, let alone the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny.”).  
10
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regulations obligated the Church to “grant some degree of preference to minorities in 
hiring.”56  
 
The court focused on the inherent inconsistency of the FCC’s policy toward 
religious exemptions,57 and its interest in promoting diversity in programming.  Under 
the FCC’s current regulations, the Church could not use religious preferences to hire a 
secretary58 but the Church was required to use racial preferences to recruit and hire the 
same secretarial position to further the interest of diversity in programming.59  The 
court refused to accept the FCC’s proposition that there exists a link between the EEO 
regulations and the FCC’s interest in programming diversity.60 
 
D.  Dissent’s Reasoning from Denial of Rehearing En Banc61  
 
Chief Justice Edwards62 suggested a rehearing to review the court’s creation of a 
constitutional issue where he felt none existed.63   He argued that the correct standard 
of review was the intermediate standard used in Metro64 stating the standard was still 
good law “and not overruled by the Court in Adarand.”65  In a separate dissent, Judge 
                                                 
56 Id. at 351.  The processing guidelines, serve as a quota or safe harbor, which, after a 
licensee’s failure to meet the numerical guidelines, triggers a review for discriminatory 
recruiting and hiring practices.  Id. at 352-54; see supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. 
57 See supra  note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the nexus test as applied to 
determine exemptions). 
58 King’s Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 61 (1974).  Under the King’s Garden policy, a 
secretarial position is not substantially connected to the religious programming of a station 
and therefore does not qualify as a religious exemption from the EEO regulation.  Id. 
59 The court stated “[t]he FCC would thus have us believe that low-level employees 
manage to get their racial viewpoint on the air but lack the influence to convey their religious 
views.  That contradiction makes a mockery out of the Commission’s contention 
 that its EEO program requirements are designed for broadcast diversity purposes.”  Lutheran 
Church, 141 F.3d at 356. 
60 Id.  
61 See infra , notes 63, 65 and accompanying text. 
62 Harry T. Edwards, Chief Justice of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.  
63 Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 154 F.3d. 494, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  Chief 
Justice Edwards argued the court mis -characterized the FCC good faith attempt to ensure 
against racial discrimination in the broadcast industry.  Id.  He characterized the EEO 
regulation as an encouragement, not an obligation, to consider minority applications.  Id.  He 
found the FCC’s use of statistical information as one, of several factors, used to foster 
internal processing of renewal applications. Id. “The guidelines reasonably can be 
understood to provide nothing more than a method for allocating the agency’s investigative 
resources.”  Id. at 499. 
64 See supra  notes 21-23 and accompanying text.  
65 Lutheran Church, 154 F.3d at 499.  The Chief Justice further stated “[b]y forcing the 
square peg of the Commission’s regulations into the round hole of the Adarand analysis, 
11
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Tatel stated that the decision takes the holding of Adarand “where no court has yet 




The Adarand decision left several questions regarding the FCC and its EEO 
regulations unanswered including the amount of judicial deference the Supreme Court 
of the United States would give to this type of congressional act.67  The decision in 
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. Federal Communication Commission68 suggests 
the answer is very little.69  This analysis will focus on three areas: 1) the FCC’s 
authority as an obstacle for judicial review in the Lutheran Church70 case;71 2) judicial 
review as a protection of the separation of powers;72 and 3) the future of the EEO 
regulations.73 
 
A.  The FCC’s Authority as an Obstacle for Judicial Review  
 
The FCC derives authority to regulate the broadcast industry from the 
Communications Act of 1934.74  The scope of the FCC’s authority is ambiguously 
                                                                                                                         
which applies only to racial classifications, the panel decision disserves the development of 
antidiscrimination doctrine.  This serious misprision of the issues calls for rehearing en banc.” 
 Id. 
66 Id. at 500.  Justice Tatel argued that nothing in the Adarand case or any other 
affirmative action cases justifies the extension of a strict scrutiny review of outreach and 
recruitment programs.  Id. at 500-01.   He suggests that the court require something more than 
“unsupported speculation” before applying strict scrutiny.  Id. at 503.  
67 S. Jenell Trigg, Comment, The Federal Communications Commission’s Equal 
Employment Opportunity and the Effect of Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 4 COM L. 
CONSPECTUS  237, 251-254 (1996) (suggesting Adarand did not completely overrule Metro  
leaving questions regarding the amount of judicial deference the Supreme Court of the United 
States will apply to affirmative action legislation).  The author classifies the critical unresolved 
question as whether a diversity of voices interest rises to the level of a compelling 
government interest.  Id. at 252-53.  
68 141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
69 Robert S. Whitman, Affirmative Action on Campus: The Legal and Practical 
Challenges, 24 J.C. & U.L. 637, 649-50 (1998) (“Lutheran Church illustrates the difficulty of 
defending affirmative action under a strict scrutiny regime.  And because the D.C. Circuit 
Court decided it, the decision could foretell even greater hostility toward Federal-government-
sponsored affirmative action programs.”). 
70 141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  
71 See infra  Part IV.A. 
72 See infra  Part IV.B. 
73 See infra  Part IV.C. 
74 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1991). 
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described as the public interest.75  Congressional delegation of authority under public 
interest “leaves the widest possible area of judgement and . . . discretion to the 
administrator.”76  In his dissent in Mistretta v. United States,77 Justice Scalia stated 
“[w]hat legislative standard . . . can be too vague to survive judicial scrutiny, when we 
have repeatedly upheld, in various contexts, a ‘public interest’ standard?”78  In Lutheran 
Church,79 the court stated “the government’s formulation of the interest seems too 
abstract to be meaningful.”80   
 
In Lutheran Church, the FCC attempted to use the public interest standard to expand 
the scope of its authority and retain exclusive control over the renewal of the Church’s 
license.81  The FCC issued a modified policy statement citing Lutheran Church after 
oral arguments were presented before the District of Columbia Circuit Court of 
Appeals.82   However, the court refused to remand the issues in the case regarding the 
FCC’s newly modified interpretation of religious exemptions under King’s Garden.83  
                                                 
75 In Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 
138, n. 2 (1940), the Court adopted the FCC’s interpretation that the public interest standard is 
comparative and flexible:  
Since the beginning of regulation . . . comparative considerations have governed the 
application of standards of ‘public convenience, interest, or necessity’ laid down by 
the law . . . the commission desires to point out that the test . . . becomes a matter of 
a comparative and not an absolute standard when applied to broadcasting stations . 
. . .  The emphasis must be first and foremost on the interest, the convenience, and 
the necessity of the listening public, and not on the interest . . . of the individual 
broadcaster. 
Id.; see also National Broadcasters v. U.S. Columbia Broadcasting System, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) 
(holding the power of the FCC under the Communications Act of 1934 was not limited to 
regulating technical matters).  The Court recognized that the Congress purposefully left the 
scope of authority vague to allow the authority of the FCC to grow and adjust with the “fluid 
and dynamic” nature of radio.  Id. at 219.  “The Act gave the Commission not niggardly but 
expansive powers.”  Id.; see also  Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communications 
Commission, 395 U.S. 367, 379 (1969). 
76 Bernard Schwartz, Curiouser and Curiouser: The Supreme Court’s Separation of 
Powers Wonderland, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 587, 595 (1990). 
77 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
78 Id. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
79 141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  
80 Id. at 354.  
81 Two months after the oral arguments, the FCC moved the court to grant a partial remand 
of the issues regarding its King’s Garden policy.  See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
82 EEO Rules and Policies, 13 F.C.C.R 6322 at ¶ 9.  “Religious broadcasters will also remain 
subject to [the Commission’s] rules . . . requiring broadcast licensees . . . to ensure equal 
employment opportunity . . . .   We hereby emphasize this continuing obligation 
notwithstanding any suggestion to the contrary in Lutheran Church . . . appeal pending.”  Id.  
83 Id. at ¶ 5.  The FCC issued a modification of the King’s Garden policy stating “the 
13
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One reason for the refusal was the FCC Commissioner’s unwillingness to make any 
recommendations to the court on the likely outcome “concerning the merits of the case 
on remand.”84  
 
In response to the FCC’s modified policy statement and requested remand, the court 
observed “the Commission has on occasion employed some rather unusual legal tactics 
when it wished to avoid judicial review, but this ploy may well take the prize.”85  The 
court’s refusal to remand the case frustrated the FCC’s attempt to retain complete 
control over the case procedurally, and substantively over the EEO regulations. 
 
The FCC raised the issue of the court’s denial to remand in its petition for rehearing 
en banc.86  The panel upheld the remand denial relying, on both the Church’s opposition 
to a remand87 and on the non-binding nature of the newly modified policy statement.88  
The FCC was unsuccessful in its attempt to assert its authority as a means to block 
judicial review. 
 
                                                                                                                         
Commission’s policy should be expanded to permit religious broadcasters to establish 
religious belief or affiliation as a job qualification for all stations.”  Id. at ¶ 3. 
84 Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 348-49.  Counsel for the FCC originally stated that the 
modified policy statement would be applied retroactively to the Church’s license renewal and 
the present sanctions would be vacated.  Id.  In a “letter [FCC]’s own counsel filed with the 
court noting that the Commissioner thought it inappropriate for the motion to remand to bind 
the Commissioners to vote in a particular way and thus wished to make no representations 
about what sort of order should ultimately be adopted.”  Lutheran Church, 154 F.3d 487, 490 
n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  The panel suggests that even under the modified policy statement the 
Church would be in violation of the EEO regulations stating “the Church would thus still 
remain obligated to exercise racial preferences within the pool of Lutheran applicants under 
the Commission’s EEO rules.”  Id.   
85 Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d. at 349.  “[W]hatever an agency’s choice among various 
interpretive options may be based upon, it should not be based upon the desire to win a 
particular lawsuit.”  Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of 
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 519-20 (1989).  Chief Justice Scalia further suggests that deference 
should only apply “to agency determinations made (with sufficient formality) in the regular 
course of the agency’s business, and not in litigation.”  Id. 
86 Lutheran Church, 154 F.3d 487, 489-90 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  The FCC raised two additional 
arguments: 1) the court was obliged to decide the Religious Freedom Reform Act issue before 
the Fifth Amendment issue; and 2) the court should not have applied a strict scrutiny 
standard.  Id. 
87 Lutheran Church, 154 F.3d 487, 489-90 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  (“If the Church had supported 
the Commission’s motion in this case, we might have had a remand.”); see Botein, supra note 
51, at 340-34 (refering to the rehearing on banc as a “rare form of relief”). 
88 The FCC argued the policy statement was a binding order that grew out of a rulemaking. 
 Id. at 489.  The court responded “we confess that we simply have no idea as to in what 
administrative law category the Commission policy statement ‘order’ falls.”  Id.  
14
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B. Judicial Review as a Protection of the Separation of Powers  
 
An independent federal agency89 that exercises executive, legislative and judicial 
power90 in excess of the authority delegated to it by Congress presents a threat to the 
doctrine of separation of powers.91  The fundamental structure of government delegates 
certain powers to particular branches and, through tradition and expertise, a particular 
branch becomes the most capable of handling its specific area of responsibility.92  An 
agency’s success rests on an internal system of checks and balances between the 
agency’s simultaneous legislative, executive and judicial functions.  An agency that acts 
outside its legislative authority represents an avenue for the government to act beyond 
the will of the people, immune from external checks on overreaching power.93   
 
The court’s holding in Lutheran Church94 suggests that judicial review can be a 
valuable check95 in the checks and balance system that belies the notion of separation of 
powers.  Chief Justice Edwards’ dissent to the decision against a rehearing concluded 
that the circuit court was “forcing the square peg of the Commission’s regulations into 
the round hole of the Adarand analysis.”96  The judicial force exerted in Lutheran 
Church97 was necessary to keep the FCC within its scope of authority under the 
Communications Act of 1934.98 
                                                 
89 The Court’s ruling in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) 
(upholding the limitation on the President’s power of removal of the commissioner of the 
Federal Trade Commission as constitutional), established the constitutionality of independent 
federal agencies. 
90 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (recognizing the “twilight zone” where 
legislative, executive and judicial actions merge together).  
91 Peter S. Guryan, Reconsidering FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund Through a Bolstered 
Functionalism, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1338, 1346 (1996) (stating “Independent agencies do not 
present any constitutional infirmities as long as the balance of power between the three 
branches is  maintained and the branches’ core functions are preserved.”).  
92 See infra  notes 93, 94 and accompanying text. 
93 Schwartz, supra note 76, at 595; see also  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 356 (James 
Madison) (Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1961) (recognizing 
the Legislature as the most powerful branch of government).   
94 141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  
95 Bernard Schwartz, “Shooting the Piano Player?” Justice Scalia and Administrative 
Law, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1995) (pointing out Scalia’s suggestion that the Constitution 
does not provide for judicial review of all constitutional claims, the decision is for the 
Congress to make not the Court).  Contra , Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607, 626 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(frustrating judicial review jeopardizes human rights and fundamental freedom); Fleming v. 
Moberly Milk Prods., 160 F.2d 259, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (finding an elimination of judicial 
power leaves only executive self-restraint).  
96 Lutheran Church, 154 F.3d. 487, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  
97 141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  
98 The FCC is limited to regulate within the scope of the public interest.  Under “public 
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In the past the Supreme Court has struggled to establish a clear standard for judicial 
review99 in separation of powers cases.100  The Court’s major separation of powers 
decisions can be categorized as either following a formalist or functionalist101 approach 
and the headless fourth branch of government102 presents problems under either 
interpretation.  An independent agency is contrary to the formalist, strict separation of 
judicial, legislative and executive power.103  Under a functionalist approach, the 
agency’s existence is permissible, but only to the degree it remains separate from the 
core functions of the three branches.104   
                                                                                                                         
interest” its EEO racial classifications cannot represent a compelling state interest narrowly 
tailored to achieve a legitimate governmental objective.  Id. at 353-57.  
99 Alexander Dill, Scope of Review of Rulemaking After Chadha: A Case for the 
Delegation Doctrine, 33 EMORY L.J. 953, 1024-25 (1984); see Rebecca L. Brown, Separated 
Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1517 (1991) (stating “the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of the constitutional separation of powers is an incoherent muddle.”). 
100 From 1983 to the present the cases demonstrate the Court’s inability to establish one 
standard applicable to the separation of powers cases.  See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 
(1983) (invalidating the legislative veto); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (invalidating 
the provisions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act granting budget cutting authority to the 
Comptroller General); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (finding the Independent 
Counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act constitutional); Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (finding the U.S. Sentencing Commission constitutional); Clinton v. 
New York, 118 S.Ct. 2091 (1998) (invalidating the presidential line-item veto). 
101 For purposes of this analysis the terms “formalism” and “functionalism” have the 
following definitions.  The formalist approach uses a strict textual interpretation of the 
Constitution as planning that the three branches each serves a separate and unique service 
exclusively.  The judicial, legislative and executive powers are independent and do not 
overlap.  The functionalist approach uses a liberal, flexible interpretation of the three 
branches.  The focus is on the core function of each branch and the degree of overlapping 
which is permissible.  See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1513 (1991) (suggesting a premise of ordered liberty to direct the Supreme Court’s 
approach to the separation of powers); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in 
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984) 
(suggesting movement away from formalism); Stephen L. Carter, From Sick Chicken to 
Synar, 1987 BYU L. REV. 719 (1987) (discussing evolutionary and de-evolutionary trends in 
the Supreme Court’s separation of powers cases); Peter S. Guryan, Reconsidering FEC v. 
NRA Political Victory Fund Through a Bolstered Functionalism, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1338 
(1996) (separation of powers case law demonstrates a judicial bias against congress); see 
generally Schwartz, supra note 76 (examining the development of separation of powers 
jurisprudence in the formalistic Burger Court and functionalist Rehnquest Court).   
102 Antonin Scalia, Historical Anomalies in Administrative Law, SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y 103, 
106 (Yearbook 1985). 
103 See Schwartz, supra note 76, at 604. 
104 Schwartz, supra note 95, at 15-16.  The Lutheran Church case demonstrates the 
problematic nature of agencies.  A formalistic approach is dependent on the existence of an 
16
Akron Law Review, Vol. 32 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol32/iss2/5
1999] LUTHERAN CHURCH MISSOURI-SYNOD V. FCC 
 
The court in Lutheran Church recognized that the FCC derived its authority solely 
from the public interest,105 and that the public’s interest in creating program diversity is 
not a compelling government interest.106  The racial classifications required under the 
present EEO regulations fail under a strict scrutiny review for three reasons.  First, the 
regulations are designed to remedy a societal discrimination that fails to rise to the level 
of a compelling government interest.107  Second, there is no direct causal connection 
between the regulations and the governmental objective of program diversity if the hired 
minorities fail to impact the viewpoints expressed on the airwaves.108  Lastly, the 
minorities who can impact on-air viewpoints may further fail to present the viewpoints 
that are necessary to create program diversity.109  
 
Judicial review of the EEO regulations served as a necessary check on congressional 
power to regulate the broadcast industry.110  The internal checks and balances within 
the FCC failed to produce a constitutional regulation.111  The court recognized that 
permitting a remand to allow the application of the modified policy statement would not 
be sufficient, in light of the FCC’s unwillingness to admit the unconstitutionality of its 
regulation.112 
                                                                                                                         
internal system of checks and balances within an agency.  Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, at 419-22 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  The blend of legislative, executive and judicial functions enabled the 
FCC to create and enforce unconstitutional EEO regulations.  Id.  A functionalist approach is 
dependent on an agency functioning within its authorized purpose.  Schwartz, supra note 95, 
at 3-6.  The FCC functions as a legislative tool to regulate the airwaves.  It’s EEO regulations, 
however, functioned like an EEOC affirmative action regulation.  The FCC was not created for 
this function and lacks the procedural safeguards necessary to ensure the proper application 
of an affirmative action regulation. 
105 Lutheran Church, 141 F3d. 344, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  The court rejected the Department 
of Justice suggestion that the FCC regulations were based on diversity in programming and 
the prevention of employment discrimination.  Id.  
106 Id. at 354. (“We do not think diversity can be elevated to the ‘compelling’ level, 
particularly when the Court has given every indication of wanting to cut back Metro 
Broadcasting.”).   
107 City of Richmond v. Cronson, 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989); see supra notes 28, 30; see also 
Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 355-56. 
108 See supra  notes 59, 60 and the accompanying text.  
109 Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 618-19 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); 
see supra note 28 and accompanying text.  
110 See supra  note 98 and the accompanying text. 
111 See supra  note 54 and the accompanying text.  
112 In Sable Communications Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989), the Court invalidated a 
prohibition of indecent but not obscene adult telephone messages and stated the judiciary’s 
duty “[t]o the extent that the federal parties suggest that we should defer to Congress’ 
conclusion about an issue of constitutional law, our answer is that while we do not ignore it, 
it is our task in the end to decide whether Congress has violated the Constitution.”  Id. at 129. 
17
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C. The Future for the FCC’s EEO Regulations  
 
The future use of the FCC’s race classifications is dependent on the agency’s ability 
to find a legitimate basis to support this type of regulation within the scope of the public 
interest.  The court in Lutheran Church instructed the FCC to determine if it has the 
“authority to promulgate an employment non-discrimination rule.”113  The FCC is 
limited to the authority granted in the Communication Act of 1934.  A revision of the 
current regulatory scheme may present a regulation that could withstand the first prong 
of a strict scrutiny analysis, a compelling governmental interest, but will fail to present a 
narrowly tailored means under the scope of the public’s interest.  Without a direct 
nexus between the compelling interest of program diversity and the FCC’s EEO 
regulations, there is no guarantee that even a station acting within the regulations will 
accomplish program diversity.114     
 
A race-based regulation aimed at preventing discrimination in employment 
throughout the broadcast industry may serve a remedial purpose.115  First, the FCC 
needs to conduct an expansive study expending time, labor and funds to produce 
documentation to prove past discrimination existed in the broadcast industry.  Second, 
the FCC needs to identify the particular viewpoints that are lacking in the programming. 
 Even accomplishing these two tasks, the main obstacle to the FCC implementing an 
EEO regulation based on race classifications is in establishing a legitimate link, a direct 
nexus, between hiring minorities and the viewpoints that result from an increase of 
minorities in the workforce.  The FCC must demonstrate that increasing the 
representation of minorities in the workforce will successfully provide the lacking 




                                                                                                                         
The panel distinguished the FCC’s remand request in Lutheran Church from the type of 
remand request it granted in Sable on the grounds of the Commission’s willingness to doubt 
the constitutionality of its own policy.  Lutheran Church, 154 F.3d. 487, 489-90 (D.C. Cir. 
1998). 
113 Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 356. 
114 The court in Lutheran Church stated the “[FCC]’s purported goal of making a single 
station all things to all people makes no sense.”  Id. at 355-56.  
115 Metro , 497 U.S. at 611 (O’Conner, J., dissenting) (“The FCC and Congress may yet 
conclude after suitable examination that narrowly tailored race-conscious measures are 
required to remedy discrimination that may be identified in the allocation of broadcasting 
licenses.”); see Barthwell Evans, supra  note 29, at 411 (finding that minority preference is 
necessary to address past discrimination and to ensure that minority views are represented 
on the airways); Brunson, supra  note 29, at 100 (failing to enforce EEO regulations resulted in 
a history of sanctioned discrimination in the broadcast industry). 
18
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It has been suggested that to allow independent agencies to exist as protectors of the 
separation of powers doctrine and to charge the courts with the duty of ensuring that 
the same agencies do not overstep their authority are two very different things.116  The 
court’s duty is particularly difficult when the authority of the agency is as broadly 
defined as the scope of the public’s interest.117  The court in Lutheran Church118 
exercised its duty by refusing to remand the case to further administrative proceedings 
while the appeal was pending.  The FCC is an extension of the Executive branch of 
government, exercising authority delegated by the Legislative branch through hearings 
modeled after the Judicial branch.   If this square peg119 is to fit within the three rings 
of government, judicial review must ensure that the addition does not upset the balance 
of power between the branches of government. 
 
Pamela J. Holder 
                                                 
116 Schwartz, supra note 76, at 587-96. 
117 Id. 
118 141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
119 Lutheran Church, 154 F.3d 495, 500 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting). 
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